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“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer and have him present with you while you’re being questioned.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to re-
present you before any questioning. Do you understand each of these
rights that I’ve explained to you? Yeah? OK. Can we talk about the
stuff we talked about earlier today? Is that a yes?” Adrian Reyes, who
had not previously spoken, answered, “Yeah.”1
To the average adult suspect, these words are clear and logical. By
providing an affirmative answer, an adult confirms his understanding of
his Miranda rights.2 Due to the cognitive development of an adult brain,
it is probable that an adult’s answer is a reliable indicator that he
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2018; B.A. Visual Arts,
University of California, San Diego, June 2003; Executive Research Editor, Golden Gate University
Law Review, Volume 48; I want to sincerely thank all the people who contributed, in one form or
another, to the completion of my Note. Special thanks go out to Heather Varanini, Professor Laura
Cisneros, Professor Jennifer Babcock, and James William Bennett. I would also like to thank the
2016-2017 Executive Board for believing in me and selecting my Note for publication.
1 Reyes v. Lewis, 833 F.3d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting from the police interrogation
of Adrian Reyes at the Riverside police station).
2 Miranda warnings are the notice about constitutional rights that law enforcement must pro-
vide to suspects prior to a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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comprehends his Miranda rights.3 What if the suspect is a minor?4 Is it
probable that a 15-year-old boy understands the purpose and significance
of his Miranda rights? Probably not,5 and consequently, by answering in
the affirmative and continuing to speak to the interrogating officer,
Adrian Reyes, 15-years-old at the time of his arrest, unknowingly waived
his Miranda rights.6
Reyes v. Lewis sheds light on an unethical and unconstitutional pro-
cedure employed when police officers use a two-step interrogation tech-
nique that violates a suspect’s constitutional rights.7 The two-step
interrogation method occurs when the police initially interrogate a sus-
pect without Miranda rights until the interrogation has produced a con-
fession.8 After obtaining a confession, which is generally inadmissible
because it violates Miranda, the next step occurs when the officer reads
the suspect his Miranda rights and then obtains a second confession.9
Determining whether a two-step interrogation process violates some-
one’s Miranda rights is known as a Seibert analysis, originating from the
case Missouri v. Seibert.10 Whereas Seibert involved an adult, the sus-
pect in Reyes was a minor charged and convicted of first-degree mur-
der.11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
this two-step interrogation process violated Reyes’ Miranda rights.12 The
court focused on the procedure and the point at which the Miranda warn-
ings were provided.13 However, a critical issue raised by this case that
was not addressed in the proceedings is whether Adrian Reyes actually
understood his Miranda rights.
Children are different from adults and this difference must be ap-
plied in the context of Miranda rights. In Reyes v. Lewis, the Ninth Cir-
3 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (“Children generally are less mature and
responsible than adults . . . often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them . . . [and] are more vulnerable or susceptible to
outside pressures than adults.”).
4 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6500 (2017) (defining a minor in California as a person under the age of
18).
5 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions.”).
6 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1033.
7 Id. at 1027-29.
8 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).
9 Id. at 605-06.
10 A Seibert analysis determines whether a two-step interrogation procedure intentionally
chosen to reduce subsequent Miranda warnings as ineffective violates a person’s Miranda warnings.
Id. at 604.
11 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1017, 1022.
12 Id. at 1031.
13 Id. at 1031-32.
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol48/iss1/4
2018] Reyes v. Lewis 7
cuit Court of Appeals should have examined not only the way the
Miranda warnings were delivered, but also Reyes’ understanding of the
Miranda warnings because Adrian Reyes was a minor. Specifically, the
court should have addressed whether Reyes, as a minor, understood his
Miranda rights and the legal consequences of waiving them.
The controversial debate—whether minors understand the complex-
ity of Miranda rights14—has prevented lawmakers from producing laws
that assist minors in comprehending these warnings.15 As a protected
class, minors should be provided with extra counseling if they are faced
with criminal charges in order to save judicial resources and help keep
innocent minors out of the criminal justice system.16 A law mandating
that minors consult with a pro tem attorney prior to questioning could
reduce the number of cases awaiting adjudication, relieve the court of
having to investigate whether the minor was coerced, threatened, intimi-
dated, tricked, or falsely promised,17 and would create a modified stan-
dard for minors and Miranda warnings. Like in Reyes, this issue is not
often addressed as there is a preference to avoid constitutional questions
if they can be resolved by non-constitutional application.18 Due to the
reality of the judiciary’s prudential doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
this Note calls for further legislative action in California to remedy this
systemic problem.
Section I provides a general background on juveniles in the criminal
justice system and how legal standards for minors continue to narrow.
Next, Section II reviews Reyes v. Lewis as it traveled from the Riverside
14 People v. Lewis, 26 Cal. 4th 334 (2001) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his young age
and low intelligence prevented him from making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his
Miranda rights); In re Norman H., 64 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1003 (1976) (“Neither a low I.Q. nor any
particular age of minority is a proper basis to assume lack of understanding, incompetency, or other
inability to voluntarily waive the right to remain silent under some presumption that the Miranda
explanation was not understood.”).
15 See In re Joseph H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (2015) (Liu, J., dissenting) (explaining that Mi-
randa waivers by juveniles “present special concerns” and questioning efficacy of Miranda warn-
ings to juveniles because of the “differences in mental capabilities between children and adults”); see
also SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1052 (May 16, 2016)
(proposing California legislation in response to Justice Liu’s dissenting statement in In re Joseph
R.—Jerry Brown vetoed the bill on September 30, 2016).
16 Minors should receive extra counseling for rehabilitation purposes as it relates to the role of
the juvenile justice system; however, the functioning of the juvenile justice system is outside the
scope of this Note.
17 In re Frank C., 138 Cal. App. 3d 708, 714 (1982).
18 The constitutional avoidance doctrine is a standard of construction that dictates “where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional ques-
tions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court’s] duty is to adopt the
latter.” Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (quoting United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v.
Del. Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
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Superior Court to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.19 Then Section III
examines how the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to address the
issue of minors and Miranda warnings, how different courts and states
have implemented modern Miranda standards for minors, and how the
California Legislature has finally passed a law that orders a mandatory
consultation with legal counsel before suspects, aged 15 years or
younger, are interrogated by police. Lastly, Section IV concludes that,
although the Ninth Circuit correctly found a Seibert violation, the court
should have used the Seibert analysis to uncover a Miranda violation and
introduce a new standard for minors and Miranda rights.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the United States, both civil and criminal law offer special protec-
tions for minors.20 One of these special protections is the juvenile justice
system.21 The juvenile court system started during the “Progressive Era”
from 1880 to 1920, when there was a shift in social and structural
changes occurring in the United States.22 Although there were conflicting
motivations for creating the juvenile courts, such as the “concern for the
welfare of the youth and . . . for the salvation of children of broken
homes,” as well as being able to control potential criminals, the juvenile
courts were ultimately formed to rehabilitate delinquent minors while
preventing social disturbances.23 The underlying philosophy preferred
paternal action—the state assumes the responsibility of acting as the pa-
rental figure—over penal action.24 Instead of punitive measures, children
would be rehabilitated through clinical procedures.25 The juvenile court
system was implemented in the children’s best interests and arose from
the belief that, with proper interventions, the youth could be saved.26
However, with the United States Supreme Court’s landmark deci-
sion In re Gault,27 the format of juvenile courts became more like adult
19 People v. Reyes, No. D047521, 2010 Cal. Ct. App. WL 3026227 (4th Dist. 2010), Reyes v.
Lewis, No. ED CV 12-691-GAF E, 2012 WL 3839528 (C.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d and remanded 798
F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2015), and rev’d and remanded 833 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2016).
20 Kathleen Michon, Juvenile Court: An Overview, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-ency-
clopedia/juvenile-court-overview-32222.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2017).
21 Alvin W. Cohn, Juvenile Justice in Transition: Is There a Future?, 63 FED. PROB. 61
(1999).
22 Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in
Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 100 (2011).
23 Id. at 100-01.
24 Id. at 101.
25 Id.
26 Cohn, supra note 21, at 61, 65.
27 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1967) (modifying the constitutional protections in juvenile
court procedures).
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criminal trials.28 Unfortunately, this shift resulted in the Supreme Court
beginning to criminalize the juvenile justice system.29 Between 1992 and
1999, politicians believed that the juvenile courts were too lenient with
juvenile offenders who committed violent crimes and supported the idea
of “adult time for adult crimes.”30 The public also agreed with the politi-
cians.31 In a 1993 poll by USA today, 73% of the people surveyed be-
lieved that the juvenile courts were too forgiving of juvenile offenders
and  argued that violent juveniles should be tried as adults.32 In response
to these demands for change, the legislature reformed the laws to treat
juvenile offenders more like adults.33
Yet in Roper v. Simmons34 and Graham v. Florida,35 the Court,
once again, recognized the differences between juvenile offenders and
adult offenders.36 The Roper Court specified that juveniles possess “a
lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which
causes “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”37 It then
reasoned that minors are vulnerable to negative influences and peer pres-
sure because they have less control over the environments surrounding
them.38 Further, the Roper Court stated that the juvenile character is dif-
ferent from that of an adult because the juvenile personality is “more
transitory [and] less fixed.”39 The Roper Court’s analysis and holding
that the death penalty cannot be imposed on individuals under the age of
28 Neitz, supra note 22, at 101 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
29 Id. at 106 (citing Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile
Court Judge, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., no. 2, 1992, at 7 (“Since the Gault case the criminalization of
the juvenile courts has continued.”)).
30 Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 265 (2007).
31 Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and the Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the
Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 271 (1999).
32 Id. at 289 n.88 (citing Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court
Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 629,
629 (1994)).
33 Neitz, supra note 22, at 107 (citing Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and the
Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
259, 272 (1999)).
34  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding that the execution of those under the age
of 18 violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
35 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (finding that a life sentence without the possibility
of parole imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide crime violates the Constitution’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment).
36 Neitz, supra note 22, at 108.
37 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 570.
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1840 demonstrated a shift away from the punitive procedures occurring in
the juvenile justice system.41
Following Roper, the Graham Court held that juveniles who com-
mitted non-homicide crimes could not be sentenced to life without pa-
role.42 The Graham Court found that, since Roper, scientific progress in
psychology and brain development continued to show fundamental dif-
ferences in the juvenile and adult minds that require juvenile offenders to
receive different treatment than adult offenders.43 The United States Su-
preme Court’s analysis in both Roper and Graham highlights the impor-
tance of understanding the developmental and psychological issues of
juvenile offenders.44
To be valid, a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights must be “volunta-
rily, knowingly, and intelligently made.”45 But an adolescent’s cognitive
development is not advanced enough to satisfy these criteria. As dis-
cussed above, in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, found that juvenile offenders are inherently less culpable than
adults because of their developmental immaturity.46 Justice Kennedy in-
dicated the three general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adult offenders: (1) lack of maturity47 and increased “reckless behav-
ior”;48 (2) susceptibility to outside pressures;49 and (3) less formed per-
sonality traits.50 Justice Kennedy illustrated this distinction by pointing
out that juveniles are denied many of the legal privileges and benefits of
adults because of their age.51 Nearly every state prohibits juveniles from
voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent because
they are immature and irresponsible.52
40 Id. at 578.
41 Neitz, supra note 22, at 109 (citing Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v.
Simmons: “Kids are Just Different” and “Kids are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273 (2008)).
42 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010).
43 Id. at 68.
44 Neitz, supra note 22, at 109.
45 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
46 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
47 Confirmed by parents and sociological and scientific studies, this lack of maturity includes
an underdeveloped awareness of responsibility that leads to impulsive actions and decisions. Id. at
569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115-16 (1982)).
48 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A De-
velopmental Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 339 (1992)).
49 Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
50 Id. at 570.
51 Id. at 569.
52 Id.
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Various state legislatures use statutes to protect minors faced with
custodial interrogations.53 In California, the Welfare & Institutions Code
section 627 (b) states that:
Immediately after being taken to a place of confinement . . . no later
than one hour after he has been taken into custody, the minor shall be
advised and has the right to make at least two telephone calls from the
place where he is being held, one call completed to his parent or
guardian, a responsible relative, or his employer, and another call
completed to an attorney. The calls shall be at public expense, if the
calls are completed to telephone numbers within the local calling area,
and in the presence of a public officer or employee. Any public officer
or employee who willfully deprives a minor taken into custody of his
right to make such telephone calls is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Even though this statutory duty supposedly helps a minor in legal
trouble, problems arise when the minor suspect is unable to contact any
parent, attorney, or designated adult. For example, in People v. Lessie, a
16-year-old defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of second-
degree murder.54 He challenged the conviction by arguing that the trial
court erred when it admitted into evidence the confessions he made dur-
ing two custodial interrogations.55 The defendant could not call his father
until after the officers completed the routine booking and he was read his
Miranda warnings because, at the time of his interrogation, he forgot his
father’s number.56 The officers continued to question the defendant, and
it was not until after he confessed that he was able to call his father; even
then, his call went unanswered.57 As quoted above, the California Wel-
fare & Institutions Code section 627 gives minors the right to telephone
calls within an hour of being taken into custody and punishes those inten-
tionally interfering with that right, which implies that the California Leg-
islature acknowledges issues faced by minors in custodial
interrogations.58 But as observed in Lessie,59 this statute is not enough. If
53 For example, Colorado, Connecticut, and Maine require the presence of either a parent or
an attorney during interrogation; whereas Indiana, Iowa, and New York provide protection to
juveniles by requiring that a parent or attorney participate in any waiver of a minor’s Fifth Amend-
ment rights. E.g., Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19–2–511(1) (1999)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b–137(a) (2012)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31–32–5–1 (1997)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 232.11,
subdivs. 1.a. & 2 (2016)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT., tit.15, § 3203–A, subdiv. 2–A (2013)); New
York (N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 305.2, subdiv. 7 (2010)).
54 People v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th 1152, 1157 (2010).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1158-59.
57 Id. at 1159-60.
58 Id. at 1166.
59 People v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th 1152 (2010).
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the call happens after a minor waives his Fifth Amendment rights, it is
impossible to know if that call and the conversation would have assisted
the minor.60
Given an adolescent’s cognitive development, it is unlikely that he
can voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights
without help. The critical issue in Reyes v. Lewis is whether Adrian
Reyes understood his Miranda warnings enough to have voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived them. For Reyes to have made the
decision to waive his rights, he must have been able to grasp “the five
components of the warning in [his] mind while processing the meaning
of the words and the concepts they express and calculating how to an-
swer.”61 When deciding if and how to answer, Reyes would have needed
to reason about present and future consequences such as: (1) how a state-
ment could and would be used against him in a court; (2) what is an
attorney and how can this attorney help in this situation; (3) what kind of
questions could be asked; (4) what does the questioner know or why is
the questioner interested in these answers; (5) how should he speak to
these adults asking questions; (6) whether his parents will have to pay for
the attorney; (7) what does it mean that an attorney will be appointed;
and (8) whether he can stop talking if he does not know the answer or
does not want to talk anymore.62 Reyes would have needed to contem-
plate and process these consequences while under the stress of a custo-
dial interrogation.
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded a Seibert violation
occurred when the officers performed an unconstitutional two-step inter-
rogation procedure on Reyes, the court should have also determined
through the Seibert analysis that a Miranda violation occurred because
Adrian Reyes did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda
rights.
60 The California Supreme Court agreed with the trial court by finding no connection between
defendant’s request to call his father and his decision to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. The
court held that “we see no basis for construing defendant’s request to speak with his father as an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights . . . . [T]he totality of the relevant circumstances supports
the trial court’s conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment
privilege.” Id. at 1170.
61 Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Chil-
dren from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 431, 432 (2006).
62 Id. at 432-33.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF REYES V. LEWIS
This section follows the path of Reyes v. Lewis from the Riverside
County Superior Court to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.63 Part A
provides the factual background and how Reyes’ age was exploited,64
resulting in his confession, arrest, and conviction.65 Next, Part B ad-
dresses the state court of appeal proceedings, describes how the Seibert
analysis was used, and reviews the habeas denials from the California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, the California Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court, and the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.66 Then Part C discusses the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ analysis in Reyes v. Lewis.
A. THE INCIDENT, THE CONFESSION, THE ARREST, AND THE SENTENCE
On January 11, 2006, Derek Ochoa, a senior at La Sierra High
School in Riverside County, was shot three times by a person in a silver
Toyota Camry.67 Ochoa did not survive the shooting.68 Officers traced
the silver Camry to the home of Andres Munoz, an older cousin of
Adrian Reyes.69 Reyes, a freshman at La Sierra, had recently moved
from Orange County to the Riverside area.70 He had just turned 15-years-
old less than two months prior to the incident.71
The day before the shooting, Reyes was walking home from school
when a car full of South Side Riverside 51-50 gang members pulled up
to Reyes and asked him where he was from.72 Reyes answered,
“Delhi.”73 In response, one of the gang members punched him in the
eye.74 A few days later, two homicide detectives from the Riverside Po-
lice Department questioned Reyes at his aunt’s house.75 Reyes was stay-
63 People v. Reyes, No. D047521, 2010 Cal. Ct. App. WL 3026227 (4th Dist. 2010), Reyes v.
Lewis, No. ED CV 12-691-GAF E, 2012 WL 3839528 (C.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d and remanded 798
F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2015), and rev’d and remanded 833 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2016).
64 Although the justices disagreed about whether the police officers exploited Reyes’ age, this
Note will not examine their differing opinions about whether Reyes’ age was exploited.
65 Reyes v. Lewis, 833 F.3d 1001, 1017-23 (9th Cir. 2016).
66 People v. Reyes, No. D047521, 2010 Cal. Ct. App. WL 3026227 (4th Dist. 2010), Reyes v.
Lewis, No. ED CV 12-691-GAF E, 2012 WL 3839528 (C.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d and remanded 798
F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2015), and rev’d and remanded 833 F.3d 1001, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2016).
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ing with his aunt because of the assault.76 During questioning, the
detectives asked Reyes about the assault, if he knew Ochoa, one of the
teenagers in the car when Reyes was assaulted, and if he knew Delhi was
a Santa Ana gang.77
On February 9, 2006, at approximately 5:00 a.m., a SWAT team
comprised of 15 to 20 officers executed a search warrant for Reyes’
aunt’s home.78 The officers handcuffed Reyes and found papers in his
bedroom with “Delhi” written in large block letters.79 Eventually, Reyes
was released from the handcuffs and allowed to eat breakfast.80 A homi-
cide detective explained to Reyes that he was not under arrest at that time
and then asked Reyes if he would accompany the detective to the station
to answer some questions.81 Reyes agreed and was driven to the River-
side police station unaccompanied by any family member.82 After being
held at the station for “some time,”83 the two homicide detectives again
questioned Reyes.84 The detectives failed to read Reyes his Miranda
warnings.85 The detectives conducted a two-hour interview86 after which
Reyes consented to take a polygraph examination the following day.87
The next day on February 10, 2006, the detectives picked up Adrian
Reyes from his mother’s house and drove him to the San Bernardino
sheriff’s station where he was given a polygraph test.88 According to the
detective’s testimony at the preliminary hearing and a police report,
Reyes’ mother provided oral consent “on the phone”89 for the polygraph
examination.90 There was no evidence of a written consent form signed
by an adult, and no family member accompanied91 Reyes to the station.92
At no point before or during the polygraph examination did anyone








83 Id. at 1017-19 (establishing that the record neither indicates how long the officers took to
initiate the February 9 interview nor the interview’s start and stop time).
84 Id. at 1017-18.
85 Id. at 1017.
86 Id. at 1019 (explaining how the “two-hour conversation” was interrupted 33 times by the
sound of sniffing).
87 Id. at 1018.
88 Id. at 1019.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See In re John S., 199 Cal. App. 3d 441, 446 (6th Dist. 1988) (stating that in California, an
officer does not need parental consent before he can interrogate a minor).
92 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1019.
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Miranda warnings.93 Reyes had a difficult time filling out and under-
standing the polygraph examination forms as well as the written consent
form.94 He was unable to provide his own height, weight, or zip code; he
was confused by the words duress, coercion, and immunity.95 Addition-
ally, Reyes was particularly uncertain about the sentence, “I hereby re-
lease the County of San Bernardino, the Sheriff’s Department and
Examiner administering this examination from any and all claims result-
ing from, or arising out of, this examination . . . .”96 The polygraph ex-
aminer had to explain to Reyes in simpler terms the forms he asked
Reyes to fill out and to sign.97 The examiner defined the meaning of
“release . . . from any and all claims,” to which Reyes suggested that it
meant the officers would not trick him.98 The examiner corrected him by
saying that the phrase did not mean that the officers would not trick him,
but then added, “[Y]ou have my word I won’t trick you.”99 Presuming
the officers would not trick him, Reyes was apparently informed and
signed the consent form.100
Upon completing the polygraph test, the examiner told Reyes that he
failed; however, there is nothing in the record indicating the actual re-
sults of the test.101 The examiner continued to ask Reyes what happened,
but Reyes repeatedly said he did not know and asked if the detectives
could come back.102 Following the polygraph examination, the detectives
entered the room and started interviewing Reyes.103 At no point during
this interview did the detectives provide Miranda warnings.104 Early dur-
ing this post-polygraph interview at the San Bernardino station was the
first time Reyes said that he shot Ochoa; yet, the detectives continued to
question him at that station, which even included a friendly discussion
about Christmas.105
After concluding the interview at the San Bernardino sheriff’s sta-
tion, the detectives drove Reyes to the Riverside police station where













105 Id. at 1021 (explaining that Reyes confessed to shooting Ochoa on page seven of the
transcript, but the detectives continued questioning him for 35 more pages).
106 Id.
11
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time, the detectives told Reyes that he could not leave.107 Finally, one of
the detectives read Reyes his Miranda rights.108 After the Miranda warn-
ings, the officers asked Reyes to continue their earlier discussion, specifi-
cally regarding the shooting of Ochoa.109 At this point, Reyes provided a
second confession.110 At the end of the interview, Reyes asked if he
could call his mom.111 Then, a detective escorted him to McDonald’s for
his first meal of the day, a late lunch.112 Altogether, the police interro-
gated Reyes for five to six hours.113
Both cousins, Adrian Reyes and Andres Munoz, were charged with
first-degree murder in the Superior Court of Riverside, an adult court.114
Although the two defendants had separate trials with different juries, the
same judge sat for both cases.115 Despite the evidence at trial mostly
pointing to Reyes’ cousin, Munoz, being the shooter and the driver of the
car, the trial judge concluded Reyes had provided a voluntary confession
following the polygraph examination because the detective had read
Reyes’ his Miranda rights, which made it a warned confession and,
therefore, admissible.116 The trial court judge suppressed the first confes-
sion because it came before the Miranda warnings.117 The jury returned
a verdict finding Reyes guilty of first-degree murder with gang and fire-
arm enhancements.118 The Superior Court judge condemned Reyes to a
prison sentence of 50 years to life.119
B. DENIALS FOR REYES: STATE COURT APPEAL, SEIBERT, AND
HABEAS PETITION
Reyes appealed to the California Court of Appeal and argued,
among other things, that his statements made at the Riverside police sta-
tion were inadmissible because his preceding statements were coerced
and involuntary.120 Instead of arguing that the police officers deliberately






113 This included the estimated three to four hours spent at the San Bernardino sheriff’s sta-
tion for his polygraph test and the post-polygraph interview, plus the 40 minutes to an hour spent at
the Riverside police station for the second interview. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1022-23.
117 Id. at 1022.
118 Id. at 1023.
119 Id.
120 People v. Reyes, No. D047521, 2010 Cal. Ct. App. WL 3026227, at *10 (4th Dist. 2010).
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violated Miranda, Reyes claimed that the State “incorrectly character-
ized Seibert as requiring ‘coordinated interrogation tactics designed to
produce an unwarned121 confession.’”122
In Seibert, a police officer performed an unwarned custodial interro-
gation123 of Patrice Seibert that induced a confession because it was
“systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill.”124 After
the unwarned confession, the officer gave Seibert a 20-minute cigarette
and coffee break.125 Following the break, Seibert was read her Miranda
warnings and she signed a written waiver of her rights.126 Then the of-
ficer questioned Seibert again and reminded her of the previous un-
warned confession.127 The officer admitted to utilizing this interrogation
technique: question first, read the warnings, and then repeat the question
until the suspect provides the same answer from the first questioning.128
Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, hold that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provides the controlling test for the Sei-
bert analysis.129 The concurrence stipulates that given specific facts of a
case, when a two-step interview occurs, the admissibility of the
postwarning statement depends on whether Miranda warnings given in
the middle of the interview could be effective.130 Justice Kennedy nar-
rowed this test by proposing that if the two-step interrogation strategy is
used deliberately, then prewarning statements and postwarning state-
ments that are substantively the same must be excluded unless curative
measures are provided before the postwarning statement.131 Curative
measures are directions “to ensure that a reasonable person in the sus-
pect’s situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda
warning and of the Miranda waiver.”132 An example of these curative
measures is cautioning a suspect that his pre-Miranda confessions would
121 An unwarned statement means that “no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel” are
provided to the person being interrogated. If the statement is unwarned then the statement could be
inadmissible in a legal proceeding. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).
122 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1006.
123 “Police questioning of a detained person about the crime that he or she is suspected of
having committed. Miranda warnings must be given before a custodial interrogation.” Custodial
Interrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
124 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616.
125 Id. at 605.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 605-06.
129 Reyes v. Lewis, 833 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was the controlling test in two-step interrogation cases; and six circuits out of seven
have agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the concurrence is the controlling test).
130 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
131 Id. at 622.
132 Id.
13
Bennett: Reyes v. Lewis
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2018
18 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
likely not be used against him.133 If curative measures are not provided,
then the postwarning confession must be omitted.134
Similar to Seibert, Reyes argued that the trial court erred and should
not have admitted his second confession because the detectives elicited
his confession using an unlawful two-step interrogation technique.135
The court rejected this argument and affirmed Reyes’ conviction.136 The
California Court of Appeal considered the issue to be whether Reyes’
unwarned and custodial post-polygraph statement was voluntary.137 The
California Court of Appeal agreed with the Superior Court judge’s sup-
pression of the unwarned post-polygraph statements at the San Bernar-
dino’s sheriff’s station and dismissed Reyes’ Seibert argument finding
that Reyes’ warned confession was voluntary and therefore admissi-
ble.138 Additionally, the California Court of Appeal concluded that, un-
like in Seibert, Reyes’ confession was voluntary because he “retained a
choice about continuing to talk” and thus, the confession was
admissible.139
Reyes filed a state habeas petition140 at the same time he filed his
direct appeal.141 The California Court of Appeal decided not to merge
the petition and the appeal, and denied the petition.142 Subsequently, the
California Supreme Court denied both the direct appeal and the habeas
petition, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.143
After the California Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court,
and the United States Supreme Court all denied his appeals and state
habeas petitions, Reyes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus144 in
133 Id.
134 Id. at 621-22.




139 Id. at 1023-24.
140 A state habeas petition is utilized where a claim is based partly on facts outside the record
of the direct appeal or where the direct appellate review is unavailable for some other reason, and
can include state law claims; whereas federal habeas corpus petitions are filed by state prisoners
arguing that their detention by state officials violates a federal constitutional right and is used to
determine the validity of state’s detention of a prisoner. J. Bradley O’Connell, State Habeas Corpus
Update and Practice Tips, FIRST DIST. APP. PROJECT, 7-8 (March 2004), http://www.fdap.org/
downloads/articles_and_outlines/state_habeas_materials_CADC_March_2004.pdf (last visited Sept.
5, 2017).
141 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1024.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1004, 1007, 1024.
144 In federal courts, habeas corpus petitions are filed by state prisoners arguing that their
detention by state officials violates a federal constitutional right and is used to determine the validity
of the state’s detention of a prisoner; whereas, state habeas petitions are utilized where a claim is
14
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federal court under 28 U.S.C. section 2254.145 Reyes argued that he was
convicted in state court because of his confession, which was obtained in
violation of Seibert.146 The district court judge relied on the Report and
Recommendation compiled by the magistrate judge.147 In his Report, the
magistrate judge focused on whether Reyes’ confession at the Riverside
police station was coerced.148 Finding there was no evidence that the
police officers deliberately used the two-step interrogation method, the
magistrate judge dismissed Reyes’ argument in a footnote.149 Without
commenting or correcting, the district court fully adopted the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation, and then denied and dismissed the
habeas petition with prejudice.150 Reyes then appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.151
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS A SEIBERT VIOLATION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals152 reviewed the district court’s
decision to deny Reyes’ habeas petition de novo.153 Although Reyes
made two arguments,154 the Ninth Circuit only focused on his second
argument that his admitted postwarning confession made at the Riverside
station violated Seibert.155 Given the coercive nature of the two-day in-
terrogation of 15-year-old Reyes, the unwarned confession and poly-
graph examination on day two, and the transport back to the Riverside
police station where the detectives obtained a postwarning confession,
the Ninth Circuit concluded a Seibert analysis was required.156
based partly on facts outside the record of the direct appeal or where the direct appellate review is
unavailable for some other reason, and can include state law claims. O’Connell, supra at note 139.
145 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1024.
146 Id. at 1023.
147 Id. at 1024.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Reyes v. Lewis, No. ED CV 12-691-GAF E, 2012 WL 3839528, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2012),
rev’d and remanded 798 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2015), and rev’d and remanded 833 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.
2016).
151 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1007.
152 This case was not heard en banc because it failed to receive a majority vote from the
active judges for an en banc consideration; thus, future petitions for rehearing en banc will not be
considered. Id. at 1002.
153 Id. at 1024.
154 Reyes’ first argument was that his confession made at the Riverside police station was
coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1025.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1029 (“Under the circumstances of this case—where police interrogated fifteen-
year-old Reyes over the course of two days; where on the first day at the Riverside police station
they conducted a two-hour unwarned interrogation; where on the second day at the San Bernardino
sheriff’s station they obtained a confession during an unwarned interrogation following an unwarned
custodial polygraph test; and where they transported Reyes back to the Riverside police station and
15
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In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated how the California Court of
Appeal misunderstood Seibert.157 The established rule in Seibert states
that if officers deliberately use the two-step interrogation technique and
if insufficient curative measures are taken to safeguard subsequent Mi-
randa warnings, then any warned statement provided by the suspect
must be suppressed, even if it was voluntary.158 The Ninth Circuit said
the state Court of Appeal misconstrued Seibert because it failed to ad-
dress: (1) whether the police officers deliberately used the two-step tech-
nique, and (2) if any curative measures were taken to ensure
understanding of subsequent Miranda rights.159 The California Court of
Appeal found that because Reyes’ first confession was voluntary, his
second warned statement at the Riverside police station was voluntary as
well.160 Unlike the California Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the coerciveness of Reyes’ post-polygraph unwarned custodial
statement at the San Bernardino sheriff’s station.161 Further, the Ninth
Circuit found that the state Court of Appeal’s question about the volunta-
riness of Reyes’ postwarning statement was irrelevant under Seibert.162
The Ninth Circuit concluded that as the California Court of Appeal’s
decision was “contrary to . . . . clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court”163 in Seibert, they owed no deference to
its decision.164
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined that both the district
court and the magistrate judge erred.165 The district court erred by enter-
ing a judgment based on the magistrate judge’s recommendation.166 De-
spite the magistrate judge’s understanding of the Seibert rule, his
conclusion failed to analyze whether the police officers deliberately used
the two-step interrogation procedure; thus, his conclusion was errone-
obtained a postwarning confession ‘clarifying’ what he had stated at the sheriff’s station—a Seibert
analysis was clearly required.”).
157 Id. at 1028.





163 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2016) (requiring that a writ of habeas corpus application made by
someone in custody because of a State court judgment will not be granted if the claim was adjudi-
cated in State court unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to “clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”).
164 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1029.
165 Id. at 1030.
166 Id.
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ous.167 As deliberateness is a factual finding, the Ninth Circuit reviewed
this finding to confirm that a mistake was made.168
In a Seibert analysis, the evidence of deliberateness can be either
objective or subjective.169 Objective evidence includes the timing, the
setting, the thoroughness of the prewarning interrogation, the overlap-
ping content between the prewarning and postwarning statements, and
the continuity of police officers.170 Subjective evidence can include an
officer’s testimony, but since delaying Miranda warnings is unlawful,
most officers will not admit to this and the court will rely heavily on the
objective evidence.171 In determining whether the interrogator deliber-
ately used a two-step interrogation procedure to impair the Miranda
warnings, a court should consider objective and subjective evidence, es-
pecially if subjective evidence is available.172 By considering both types
of evidence, a court can make a better determination whether an interro-
gator deliberately used the two-step interrogation procedure.173
Based on the objective evidence, the Ninth Circuit found a Seibert
violation because the officers deliberately employed the two-step interro-
gation technique.174 The court concluded that the unwarned interroga-
tions were similar to the Seibert interrogation because they were
“systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill.”175
Moreover, all three of the police officers were experienced homicide
detectives.176 The lead investigator employed no curative measures to
confirm that Reyes understood the importance and effect of his Miranda
warnings and waiver.177 For example, he declined to ask Reyes for the
Miranda waiver in order to establish that Reyes read and understood his
rights.178 Moreover, the detective minimized the importance of the Mi-
randa rights when he read them to Reyes.179 The Ninth Circuit explained
that an experienced detective would know that downplaying the Miranda
167 Id. at 1029-30.
168 Id. at 1030 (citing United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001))).
169 Id.
170 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams 435 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)).
171 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 479 (2d Cir. 2010))).
172 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006)).
173 Id. (quoting United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 479 (2d Cir. 2010)).
174 Id. at 1031.
175 Id. (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004)).
176 Id. (“Inexperience, while not a legitimate excuse for postponing a Miranda warning, nev-
ertheless may save a confession from exclusion under Seibert.”) (quoting United States v. Capers,
627 F.3d 470, 481 (2d Cir. 2010)).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1032.
179 Id.
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warnings and then reading them to a reasonable person with no legal
training, especially a 15-year-old high school freshman, would probably
conceal the importance of these warnings and how they could be the
difference between going home that day and spending his life in
prison.180 Accordingly, the court found the “psychological, spatial, and
temporal break” between the unwarned and warned interrogations was
not sufficient to fix the Miranda violation.181 The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that instead of providing curative measure to ensure Reyes under-
stood his warnings, the detectives took affirmative steps to guarantee that
Reyes was unaware of the importance and the effect of his Miranda
waiver.182
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the two police officers who inter-
rogated Reyes violated Seibert, as they deliberately employed the unlaw-
ful two-step interrogation technique, and also neglected to take
appropriate curative measures.183 The court held that Reyes’ postwarning
confession at the Riverside police station should have been suppressed at
the trial court.184 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus185 and remanded with instructions
to grant the writ of habeas corpus unless Reyes was retried within a rea-
sonable time, which was not to exceed 180 days.186
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY IS A CRITICAL
MATTER FOR MINORS
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly held there was a Seibert viola-
tion, the court missed an opportunity to address whether Reyes under-
stood his Miranda rights. The Seibert analysis can be separated into two
prongs: procedural and substantive.187 The procedural prong asks if the
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1033.
183 Id. at 1029-30.
184 Id. at 1033.
185 Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the United States District Court Judge Dolly M.
Gee granted Reyes’ conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordered that the respondent discharge
Reyes from all the consequences of his conviction unless Reyes is brought to retrial within a reason-
able time, not exceeding 180 days. The judgment was ordered on September 26, 2016. Reyes v.
Lewis, No. ED CV 12-691-DMG (Sept. 26, 2016), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/cacdce/5:2012cv00691/531580/35 (last visited on Sept. 5, 2017).
186 Reyes, 833 F.3d at 1033.
187 In Senior District Judge Singleton’s concurrence, he described the two prongs as the
“Kennedy prong” and the “Souter prong.” The “Kennedy prong” focuses on whether the two-step
procedure was intentional, and the “Souter prong” asks if the two-step procedure—intentional or
not—caused the subsequent warnings to be ineffective. Id. at 1034-35 (Singleton, J., concurring).
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two-step process is intentional.188 The substantive prong examines the
effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.189 The court could have ad-
dressed Reyes’ understanding of his Miranda rights by focusing on Sei-
bert’s substantive prong and potential curative measures. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit concluded the Seibert analysis before fully exploring the
second prong and addressing whether Reyes understood the implications
and consequences of waiving his Miranda rights.190 The court should
have also analyzed if curative measures are even available to a minor
who does not comprehend the complexities of the Miranda warnings.
From a tactical perspective, it is logical for the court to suspend its exam-
ination as a matter of judicial prudence. However, from a public policy
perspective, this question is a critical one. Investigating this comprehen-
sion issue could conserve precious judicial resources and, more impor-
tantly, keep minors out of the prison system.
A. COMPETENCY OF MINORS AND MINORS AS A PROTECTED CLASS
Minors are a protected class because the cognitive functioning of an
adolescent is not equivalent to that of an adult.191 The federal standard
determining the validity of a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda is a “totality
of the circumstances” from the 1979 case Fare v. Michael,192 which con-
siders age, prior experiences, education, background, and intelligence.193
188 Id. at 1034 (Singleton, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 1035 (Singleton, J., concurring) (finding that the Souter prong [second prong] asks if
the Miranda warnings were ineffective because of the two-step process and focuses on “whether the
process itself challenged the comprehensibility and effectiveness of the Miranda warnings”).
190 Id. at 1034-35 (Singleton, J., concurring).
191 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (2016) (“Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear
proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.”). See
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”). See In
re Michael B., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1073 (1983) (concluding that a Miranda waiver by a nine-year-old
was invalid).
192 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 707-08 (1979) (Michael C. was 16-years-old when he
was taken into custody for murder. Before questioned by police, he was read his Miranda rights. He
requested to see his probation officer—he was on probation to the Juvenile Court—but the police
denied this request. The 16-year-old then refused to talk without consulting an attorney. During this
exchange, he drew sketches and made statements implicating him in the murder. When he was
charged with murder in Juvenile Court, he moved to suppress the statements and sketches arguing
that admitting them would be in violation of Miranda. The court disagreed and denied the motion.
The California Supreme Court reversed and found that his request for his probation officer was an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court found that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court erred in finding his request was in violation of Miranda. The Court held that the
16-year-old knowingly and voluntarily waived his right and that the statements and sketches could
be used against him in Juvenile Court.).
193 Id. at 725.
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Although juveniles do not possess the “psychosocial maturity” and “cog-
nitive capacity” to waive their Miranda rights,194 courts continue to ap-
ply the totality of the circumstances standard to decide whether a
juvenile has the capacity to understand the warnings, his Fifth Amend-
ment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.195 As this law
was established 38 years ago,196 its interpretation and application are
dated and ineffective.
Scientific advancements have improved understanding about brain
development since Fare was decided in 1979, revealing that the juvenile
brain is significantly less developed than previously understood.197 The
limits of adolescents are recognized socially as they are not allowed to
vote, serve on juries, watch movies with adult content, drink alcohol, or
enter into contracts.198 However, minors are generally treated the same
as adults when they are arrested, interrogated, and read the standard Mi-
randa rights, despite scientific evidence proving the limitations in ado-
lescent cognitive functioning.199 This equivalency is problematic because
it ignores the difference between physical and cognitive maturity as sup-
ported by extensive scientific research.200 Although physical maturity
may give the illusion of mental maturity, juveniles “may not appreciate
the consequences or weigh information the same way as adults do . . . .
[and] their brain may in fact not be mature.”201 The new information
about juvenile brain functioning requires that the Fare standard be inter-
preted and applied with a modern requirement addressing the scientifi-
cally proven discrepancy. This requirement would better safeguard
juveniles and the constitutional protection envisioned by the Miranda
court.
Adolescents, like Adrian Reyes, are in a vulnerable position when
subjected to advanced interrogation techniques because they do not un-
derstand the consequences of their answers.202 This leads to many false
194 King, supra note 60, at 431.
195 Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
196 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
197 Ortiz, Adam, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death Penalty–Adolescence,
Brain Development and Legal Culpability, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. JUV. JUST. CENT., http://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adoles
cence.authcheckdam.pdf.
198 Id. at 1.
199 Albert C. Mendoza, Comment, SB 1052: Miranda Rights for Minors, 48 U. PAC. L. REV.
801, 804 (2017) (citing In re Joseph H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 1, 1 (Cal. 2015)). See King, supra note
60, at 466.
200 Ortiz, supra note 194, at 2.
201 Id.
202 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 944 (2004) (presenting demographic data on false confessions by
minors). See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) (explaining that the pressures of custodial
20
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confessions.203 Research shows that only 21% of children compared to
42% of adults understand the importance and meaning of the Miranda
warnings.204 Additionally, this same research determined that 55% of
juveniles misunderstood at least one component in the Miranda warn-
ings.205 There is an excessive susceptibility of minors to falsely confess
when false evidence is posed against them, evidenced by a study where
78% of 12 to 13-year-olds and 70% of 15 to 16-year-olds falsely con-
fessed when fabricated evidence was presented against them.206 In the
same study, 59% of 18 to 26-year-olds falsely confessed.207 Comparing
these numbers demonstrates the vulnerability of minors whose brains
have not fully developed and how it affects their decision-making.208
Minors are unlikely to understand the consequences of their confes-
sions if they are not provided guidance about their rights and the signifi-
cance of those rights. While an adolescent’s brain continues to mature
and learns how to coordinate emotion, intellect, behavior, and ability, it
is also learning about long-term goals and consequences.209 An adoles-
cent might appear to be able to make adult decisions, but his “sense of
time, lack of future orientation, labile emotions, calculus of risk and gain,
and vulnerability to pressure” will often cause him to make very different
decisions than an adult would make in similar situations.210 A common
reason for teenage false confessions is the belief that by providing a con-
fession, whether it is true or false, they can go home.211 The Court in
Gallegos acknowledged that police interrogations subject a juvenile to an
intimidating environment when it stated that “a 14-year-old boy, no mat-
ter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will
interrogations are so immense, they cause high percentages of people to falsely confess). See Brief
for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2010) (No. 09-11121) (describing empirical studies that “illustrate the
heightened risk of false confession from youth”).
203 Drizin & Leo, supra note 199.
204 Thomas Grisso, Juvenile’s Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1153 (1980) (providing statistics about the differences between adults and
juveniles in their understanding of Miranda warnings).
205 Id. at 1153-54.
206 Stephanie Forbes, Reading, Writing, and Interrogating: Providing Miranda Warnings to
Students in Schoolhouse Interrogations, 47 CT. REV. 68, 70 (2011).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE SCI. 69 (2005).
210 King, supra note 60, at 436 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilt by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1011-12 (2003)).
211 Drizin & Leo, supra note 199, at 969.
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confront him when he is made accessible only to the police.”212 Scien-
tific evidence confirms the urgency of protecting minors involved with
the criminal justice system and their need of assistance in criminal
proceedings.
Although it appears that in 2011, the United States Supreme Court
majority agreed that the Miranda standard needed modifying, this posi-
tion is vulnerable to being reversed.213 In that case, a policeman removed
13-year-old J.D.B. from his seventh grade classroom and interrogated
him about two home break-ins.214 J.D.B. was not read his Miranda warn-
ings and was not told that he could leave the room where he was ques-
tioned.215 The Court in J.D.B. held that if a child’s age is apparent to an
officer at the time of questioning, then it needs to be considered in a
juvenile’s custodial interrogation analysis.216 The dissent by Justice Al-
ito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
criticized the majority’s “extreme makeover of Miranda.”217 The dis-
senting justices focused on the need to retain the clarity and simplicity of
the custodial interrogation analysis, arguing that minors are already pro-
tected from coercive interrogation by the constitutional voluntariness
standard218 anchored in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.219 Yet, as identified above, scientific evidence sup-
ports the need to acknowledge the difference between an adolescent’s
brain and an adult’s brain. As more information about differences in cog-
nitive functioning becomes available, there is a critical need to adjust the
criminal justice system to support these findings.
212 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (emphasizing the vulnerability of children
when they interact with the police). See also THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (PBS 2012) (documenting the
struggles of five wrongfully accused and wrongfully convicted adolescents in the New York City’s
Central Park jogger case).
213 “The State and its amici contend that a child’s age has no place in the custody analysis, no
matter how young the child subjected to police questioning. We cannot agree . . . . [t]o hold, as the
state requests, that a child’s age is never relevant to whether a suspect has been taken into custody—
and thus to ignore the very real difference between children and adults—would be to deny children
the full scope of the procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees to adults.” J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271, 281 (2011).
214 Id. at 265.
215 Id. at 266.
216 Id. at 277.
217 Id. at 282-84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
218 Standard ensuring that incriminating statements are not obtained through coercive means.
Id. at 282-83 (Alito, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 284 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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B. CALIFORNIA SHOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION TO
JUVENILES
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled how Miranda
warnings apply to juveniles in relation to these new scientific develop-
ments.220 Until the United States Supreme Court delegates a change,
state courts are responsible for safeguarding their minors in custodial in-
terrogations.221 The Ninth Circuit should have used Reyes v. Lewis to
implement change for minors and Miranda rights, but it failed to use this
case as a platform to change the Miranda standard for minors.
Presently, California courts have not established any laws to ensure
that minors are informed when they provide Miranda waivers and con-
fessions.222 California courts should refer to states that have addressed
the issue in order to develop its own protections for minors. For example,
the Supreme Court of Indiana held that juvenile suspects are awarded
certain safeguards to ensure that their confessions are voluntary and their
waivers are well-informed.223 Miranda waivers are accepted only after
the minor is given an opportunity to meet and consult with the minor’s
parents or guardian, or the minor’s attorney.224 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that juveniles cannot waive constitutional
rights unless they are informed of them in age-appropriate language.225
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found that Miranda warnings must
be fully explained to ensure a juvenile’s comprehension of his Miranda
rights, which may require additional clarification by police officers.226
Additionally, New Mexico has introduced a mandate where confessions
by children under 13 are simply not admissible in court.227 For ages 13 to
14, confessions are presumed inadmissible; and for ages 15 and older,
courts examine age, custody status, delivery of the rights, circumstances
of the questioning, and presence of a parent or attorney.228 Further, Wis-
consin does not admit into court any juvenile confession unrecorded by
220 Raymond Chao, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple as A-B-C, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 521,
524 (2000).
221 U.S. CONST. amend. X (mandating that any power not given to the federal government is
given to the people of the states).
222 In re Joseph H. 237 Cal. App. 4th 517 (2015) (applying the totality of the circumstances
test to determine a valid waiver of Miranda rights even where a minor is involved in the
interrogation).
223 Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 439 (1972).
224 Id.
225 State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 19 (1985).
226 State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373, 378-80 (Me. 1982).
227 Lorelei Laird, Police Routinely Read Juveniles Their Miranda Rights, But Do Kids Really
Understand Them?, ABA J., June 2016.
228 Id.
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the police.229 Likewise, Illinois courts refuse to admit juvenile confes-
sions unless an attorney was present at the time of the confession.230
Although the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to address minors
and Miranda warnings, the judiciary is not the only branch of govern-
ment that can respond to Miranda issues. State legislatures can also mod-
ify how minors receive their Miranda warnings.231 In fact, multiple
jurisdictions are responding to the Miranda problem in different ways
through legislation. Recently in New York, Senator Michael Gianaris in-
troduced a bill mandating the use of simpler language when law enforce-
ment Mirandize juveniles.232 Other states that require a parent, attorney,
or custodian present for custodial interrogations include Colorado,233
Connecticut,234 and Maine.235 Similarly, the following states require a
parent or attorney to participate in any waiver of Fifth Amendment
rights: Indiana,236 Iowa,237 and New York.238 The number of states that
legislatively acknowledge this urgency to modify how minors are
Mirandized shows that there is a disparity with the conventional Miranda
warnings when they are read to minors.
The California Legislature has also recognized the minor and Mi-
randa issue. In 2016, the California Senate tried to pass Senate Bill 1052
that would have enacted section 625.6 subdivision (a) of the Welfare &
Institutions Code, requiring minors to meet with counsel prior to a custo-
dial interrogation.239 SB 1052 would have “require[d] that a youth under
18 years of age consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by
video conference prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving
any of [his or her] rights.”240 The bill also specified that the required
consultation with legal counsel could not be waived.241 Governor Brown
vetoed242 the bill on September 30, 2016, stating that he was not pre-
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Legislature, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the legislature as “the
branch of government responsible for making or changing statutory laws” including state
legislatures).
232 Laird, supra note 223.
233 COLO. REV. STAT. §19–2–511(1) (2017).
234 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–137(a) (2017).
235 ME. REV. STAT., tit.15, § 3203–A., subdiv. 2–A (2017).
236 IND. CODE § 31–32–5–1 (2017).
237 IOWA CODE § 232.11 (2016).
238 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 305.2, subdiv. 7 (2010).
239 S.B. 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015-2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (enrolled and presented to the Gover-
nor on Sept. 8, 2016, vetoed on Sept. 30, 2016).
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Custodial Interrogation: Juveniles, S.B. 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015-2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052 (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2017).
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pared to put this law into practice because of the potential ramifica-
tions.243 The Governor justified his veto by stating concerns such as:
sanctions for failing to follow SB 1052; frustration of the criminal justice
system by doubting confessions introduced at trial; costly expenses; and
potential inefficiency as defense attorneys would need to be present
when officers take juveniles into custody.244
In response to the veto of SB 1052, Democratic State Senators Holly
Mitchell and Ricardo Lara introduced Senate Bill 395 on February 15,
2017.245 Similar to SB 1052, this bill proposed to reform section 625.6 of
the Welfare & Institutions Code as it relates to minors by protecting them
against the consequences of unknowingly waiving their Miranda
rights.246 On October 11, 2017, SB 395 successfully passed through the
California Legislature with the Governor’s approval.247  SB 395 requires
that prior to a custodial interrogation and before minors can waive their
Miranda rights, those minors—aged 15 years or younger—must consult
with legal counsel by phone, in person, or by video conference.248 By
requiring a mandatory consultation with legal counsel,249 this bill will
hopefully ensure that juveniles within this age group can understand the
warnings and if they so choose can not only voluntarily, but also know-
ingly and intelligently waive their Miranda rights. With the passage of
SB 395, the California Legislature recognizes the complexity of Miranda
warnings as applied to minors. However, whereas this bill is a step in the
right direction, it only affects minors that are 15-years-old and younger.
In order to protect the rights of all California minors who find themselves
ensnared in a custodial interrogation, further action is still required.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that experienced of-
ficers committed a Seibert violation when they utilized a two-step inter-
rogation procedure against 15-year-old Adrian Reyes, the court missed
an opportunity to address whether Reyes, as a minor, understood his Mi-
randa rights. The court should have further analyzed the second prong of
the Seibert analysis to determine whether Reyes understood the implica-
243 ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, COMM. ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1052, at 14-16 (June 28,
2016).
244 Id.
245 S.B. 395, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (enrolled and presented to the Governor on
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tions and consequences of waiving his Miranda rights as well as analyz-
ing if curative measures would benefit a minor who does not
comprehend the complexities of the Miranda warnings. Although judi-
cial prudence asks for a narrow interpretation of the Constitution, the
court should have examined this issue in the interest of protecting the
constitutional rights of minors.
Modern scientific evidence has affirmatively established that minors
do not have the cognitive abilities of adults. Yet, the minors and Miranda
controversy continues to frustrate the legal system. There are many rec-
ommendations advising how to assist juveniles involved in interrogation
proceedings and how to ensure that their constitutional rights are not vio-
lated. As explained above, the California Legislature has experienced ob-
stacles in its pursuit to amend minors’ Miranda rights and has only
recently successfully passed a law remedying some of these differences.
Although the passage of SB 395 will safeguard some of California’s
minors—at least those aged 15 years and younger—against facing custo-
dial interrogations alone, the Miranda warnings should be revised when
applied to all minors. The Ninth Circuit should have used Reyes v. Lewis
to develop a modern standard for minors’ Miranda warnings. By recog-
nizing there was not only a Seibert violation, but also a Miranda viola-
tion, the court should have established that there is a constitutional
violation when minors are expected to understand the consequences of
waiving their Miranda rights without the help of a parent, custodian, or
attorney. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should have determined
that legal counsel must be present to guarantee that any aged minor can
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his privileges. If such an
attorney could have assisted Adrian Reyes, it is likely that Adrian would
have never seen a day in court.
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